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(Trial resumed)

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Sheridan. You're reminded you're still under oath.

THE WITNESS: Good morning. Okay.

- PAUL SHERIDAN,
- 6 | CROSS-EXAMINATION CONTINUED
- 7 BY MR. HOSENPUD:
- Q. Good morning, Mr. Sheridan. I want to touch on a fewthings from yesterday.
 - Isn't it true that you do not recall and testified what your response was to Mr. Dempsey's request for a month to month.
- 13 A. That's correct.
- Q. And you don't recall telling Mr. Dempsey that a written agreement for a month to month would be entered, correct?
- 16 A. That's correct.
- Q. And you never told Mr. Dempsey in this phone call that you
- 18 | lack the authority as chief executive to grant a month to
- 19 month, correct?
- 20 | A. Correct.
- 21 Q. Now, you communicated to Mr. Ma about this, and he approved
- 22 | a month to month, correct?
- 23 A. Correct.
- 24 | Q. And you never told Mr. Dempsey of Gerald Ma's approval,
- 25 | correct?

- 1 A. Correct.
- 2 | Q. Let's look at exhibit 84, please.
- 3 You were questioned yesterday, Mr. Sheridan, about
- 4 | this exhibit and asked about Mr. Ma's first reaction, correct?
- 5 A. Correct.
- 6 Q. And you understood that to be that rents had to be paid in
- 7 | full before the first delivery; isn't that correct?
- 8 A. Correct.
- 9 Q. And that was a consistent message that you had conveyed or
- 10 Ms. O'Callaghan had conveyed to Frontier, correct?
- 11 A. That's correct.
- 12 | Q. Let's now look at Joint Exhibit 85. You were shown Joint
- 13 Exhibit 85 yesterday, and I'd like to just scroll down to
- 14 orient you, sir.
- 15 || This is Mr. Dempsey's communication to you on April
- 16 | 13, 2020, correct?
- 17 A. Correct.
- 18 | Q. And in it he's updating you that Airbus was willing to move
- 19 | two aircraft in the short-term, two month in the short-term,
- 20 | first aircraft in June, next two in July; is that right?
- 21 A. That's correct.
- 22 | Q. And this is when you knew at this point that there would be
- 23 | no May delivery, this is April 13, 2020, correct?
- 24 A. Correct.

Q. And he had sent you a text over Saturday indicating the

- 1 same information, which was April 11; is that right?
- 2 A. That's right.
- 3 Q. Your response is listed above in the email chain. You
- 4 apologize for the delay, and you state, Essentially we want to
- 5 | tie the deliveries to having no outstanding deferrals, so it
- 6 | would only work if we recast the deferral agreement. You see
- 7 | that reference?
- 8 | A. Yes.
- 9 | Q. I'm sorry, sir?
- 10 A. Yes, I see that, yes.
- 11 | Q. Thank you. And that is your effort to make consistent the
- 12 delivery deferral and repayment period, but you never sent
- 13 | anything to Frontier in writing to match the delivery time of
- 14 | the next aircraft, did you?
- 15 | A. We never updated the deferral, the draft deferral agreement
- 16 | that we had previously sent that had the longer repayment
- 17 period, no.
- 18 Q. Right. Because that repayment period was no longer
- 19 applicable given that AMCK wanted Frontier to be current with
- 20 | the next delivery, correct?
- 21 A. Correct.
- 22 | Q. I'd like to move forward to another point that you
- 23 discussed on direct examination. We're going to look at
- 24 | exhibit 101. Let's scroll down to the email I'm focusing on in
- 25 the section of exhibit 101, page one.

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You stated that one thing was clear, on thing that was clear, the directors didn't want to answer the question of what happens if Frontier gets current on all rent and we come up to a delivery.

Isn't it true, sir, that they never answered the

question, and that is why you were making that observation?

A. I don't recall how the discussion went at the board

meeting, but I think nobody wanted to make a decision on what

would happen if Frontier had paid the overdue rents at that

point.

- Q. You say they're overdue at that point, but did you say they were overdue in this email?
- A. I didn't, but it was the 22nd of April, so we would have known they were overdue at that point.
 - Q. Did you say anything to Frontier that the rents were overdue at that point?
- 17 | A. No.
- Q. Let's look at exhibit 100. These are the minutes that you chaired on April 22, 2020; is that correct?
- 20 A. That's correct.
- Q. Turning to paragraph 7.13. There's a reference relating to you, the chairman. You were chairing the meeting, correct?
- 23 A. Correct.
- Q. The chairman advised that it was intended to revert to the airlines and renegotiate as to whether deliveries needed to

- 1 | take place during the period of rent deferrals; correct?
- 2 A. That's what it says, yes.
- 3 | Q. And you were still in negotiation with Frontier, correct?
- 4 A. Correct.
- 5 Q. And Frontier, as you knew, was still in negotiation with
- 6 Airbus, weren't they?
- 7 A. Yes, correct.
- 8 | Q. Let's go back to 101, please. I'm focusing your attention,
- 9 | sir, on the second paragraph of this email exchange at the top.
- 10 And this is Ms. O'Callaghan telling you that it would be better
- 11 | to tell Frontier that AMCK cannot get the shareholder
- 12 comfortable with funding at 2019 contracted pricing, even if
- 13 | they are completely current on all payments. You see that
- 14 | reference?
- 15 | A. I do.
- 16 Q. You never authorized her to do so, did you?
- 17 A. I don't think I did, no.
- 18 | Q. And you knew that if Frontier had any inclination about
- 19 AMCK's position, it would have paid rent, correct?
- 20 | A. I think it's likely, but we didn't know what their mindset
- 21 was at that point.
- 22 | Q. Right. But if they knew that even if they were current the
- 23 shareholder was not agreeable to funding these aircraft --
- 24 | A. No.
- 25 | Q. Just a minute, sir. -- do you have any doubt in your mind

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1 | that Frontier would have made payment?

- A. Well, I would just not characterize it that I knew that the shareholder would not fund. But if there was a warning of it, I would imagine they wouldn't make payments of the overdue rent, yes.
- Q. Let's move on. We're going to look at exhibit 111.
- 7 Mr. Sheridan, I'm focusing your attention on the April 27 email
 8 from Mr. Dempsey in the center of the front page of this
 9 exhibit where he says to you he's been briefed by Robert and
 10 was working on the assumption that we had to be current on all
 11 rent for you to finance the upcoming deliveries. And that is
- 12 consistent with AMCK's position as of April 27, correct?
- A. That is correct. I would say when you see some of these -the term "current" can mean a lot of things. And so really
 what we wanted was no deferred rent and no overdue rents.
 - Q. And he's pointing out to your email below, which the idea was to tie the outstanding deliveries to having no outstanding deferrals of rent, so it would only work if we recast the
- 19 deferral agreement; isn't that right?
 - A. That's right.
- 21 \parallel Q. So the subject matter in your understanding and in
- 22 Mr. Dempsey's understanding was being current with rent before
- 23 the next delivery and funding would ensue?
- A. Well, I think having no outstanding deferrals at the delivery, being current in terms of not having any overdue rent

- 1 is a given.
- 2 No outstanding deferrals and being current on rent, that's
- how you constructed this message to Mr. Dempsey, isn't it? 3
- I would say that I constructed the message to say no 4
- 5 outstanding deferrals at the time.
- 6 Q. And then it says the six-month period was set to allow for
- 7 repayments of deferred rent as to be over the deferral period.
- That's what you say in your April 13 email, correct? 8
- A. Correct, the six-month period in the deferral agreement 9
- 10 that we had sent.
- 11 The six-month period in the ask that you had made?
- 12 Yes. Sorry, excuse me, yes.
- 13 So there's an integrated linkage between being current on 0.
- 14 the rent deferrals at the time of the first delivery, that's
- all we're talking about here, isn't it? 15
- I would say that there's a linkage in agreed deferrals of 16
- 17 rent and the delivery. Overdue rent are a separate category.
- You mentioned nothing about overdue rent, did you? 18
- I did not. 19 Α.
- 20 You didn't tell Mr. Dempsey that there was rent due on the
- 21 27th, did you?
- 22 Α. On the 27th, no, I did not.
- 23 And nobody from AMCK did so, did they? 0.
- 24 Α. No.
- 25 Let's turn now to exhibit 121, please. All right.

- 1 Mr. Sheridan, you were asked some questions about exhibit 121
- 2 | yesterday. This is an email from you to Gerald Ma dated April
- 3 | 30, 2020. You see that?
- 4 | A. I do.
- 5 | Q. And you are reflecting to Mr. Ma that Frontier responded
- 6 | today as follows: They understand they must be current on all
- 7 payments at and beyond closing. They will immediately pay
- 8 | outstanding April rents on which we agreed an informal deferral
- 9 pending agreement with Airbus on delivery delays.
- 10 Do you see that language?
- 11 | A. I do.
- 12 | Q. And the language that is yours in this communication is the
- 13 | language, On which we agreed an informal deferral pending
- 14 | agreement with Airbus on delivery delays, correct?
- 15 A. That's what it says.
- 16 | Q. And yesterday I believe you testified that that language
- 17 | meant the ten day April 6 deferral?
- 18 A. Yes, correct.
- 19 Q. You don't say that here, do you?
- 20 | A. I don't.
- 21 | Q. And your language is tied to having a pending agreement
- 22 | with Airbus on delivery delays, correct?
- 23 A. That's correct.
- 24 | Q. And to your knowledge there was no pending agreement at
- 25 | that time, was there?

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- At the time we knew that the discussions had only gone to a point of having the give or take two-month delay of delivery.
- Q. You knew that the discussions were still ongoing, did you 3 4 not?
 - A. I don't remember by the 30th of April if any of the discussions were still ongoing, but at that stage we were still just talking about whether we would accept the proposed deliveries of July 2020 as discussed here.
 - Q. Let's look at point three, sir. It says, They will swap our last two deliveries in September, Sept and Oct 2020 to February 2021 with another lessor, or they will get Airbus to agree to pushout, not a hundred percent clear. That's what you said at that time, correct?
- 14 A. Correct.
 - Q. And so you knew the negotiations were ongoing with Airbus to satisfy the condition of AMCK to push aircraft deliveries as far out as possible?
- 18 Yes, I can accept that is correct.
- 19 Now, going back up to item one where we were. Q.

At no time did you ask Frontier to pay rent when they told you they would immediately pay all outstanding April rents, correct?

- Α. That's correct.
- 24 Now, up above this Mr. Ma is saying, Can you confirm this is their firm offer. Do you see that reference?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. And he ask, Nothing else, no extension and compensation or
- 3 penalty to them if they're overdue again. And then in all
- 4 | caps, Is this the best we can do. All caps again, We only have
- 5 one shot at this. You see that reference?
- 6 | A. Yes.
- 7 Q. Typically in your experience in communicating by email are
- 8 | all capital statements kind of like screaming or yelling?
- 9 A. Typically, although Mr. Ma did use them reasonably
- 10 regularly. Not that he was screaming reasonably regularly, but
- 11 that he use them for emphasis.
- 12 | Q. Now, isn't it true you also ultimately confirmed that this
- 13 was the firm offer from Frontier to Mr. Ma, correct?
- 14 A. I don't recall that. If you can show me an email that says
- 15 | it.
- 16 | Q. Didn't you testify in your deposition to that effect?
- 17 | A. I don't recall. You'd have to show me. If I did, I can
- 18 | accept it.
- 19 Q. We'll go back to that. Before responding to Mr. Ma, isn't
- 20 | it true that Jane O'Callaghan had an email exchange with you on
- 21 | April 30 relating to Frontier Airlines' proposal that is
- 22 | reflected in exhibit 121?
- 23 A. Yes, that's correct.
- 24 | Q. And isn't it true that Ms. O'Callaghan tells you in that
- 25 email exchange that she believes the Frontier proposal is final

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- and firm and AMCK has to go with it?
- 2 I think you have to show me that email. I don't recall. Α.
 - You don't have a memory at this point? Q.
 - Not of that specific email, no. Α.
 - MR. HOSENPUD: May I approach the clerk, your Honor? Your Honor, I would like to know if we have permission to publish? We can do so. We have it.
- THE COURT: Thank you. Is this a joint exhibit? 8
- 9 MR. HOSENPUD: It is not, your Honor.
 - THE COURT: Very well. It is received. You can publish it.
- 12 MR. HOSENPUD: Will you please publish plaintiff 13 exhibit 11.
- 14 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 received in evidence) BY MR. HOSENPUD:
- Q. Let's look at this. Ms. O'Callaghan on April 30, 2020 is 16
- 17 indicating to you that the discussions had been going on for
- two weeks, and that she believed, she do believe this is their 18
- 19 final and firm position and states, I think we have to go with
- 20 it. Does that refresh your recollection?
- 21 A. I don't recall the email, but I can see that is what it 22 says, yes.
- 23 Q. Then she goes onto discuss the downside if AMCK notifies 24 Frontier that AMCK cannot do the next three deliveries in July
- 25 because you can't get your shareholder on board. You see that

- 1 reference?
- 2 | A. Yes, I do.
- 3 Q. And she starts to itemize the consequences. Do they sue us
- 4 | for breach of contract? You see that reference?
- 5 | A. Yes.
- 6 Q. This could prove a terrible distraction and waste of
- 7 | internal resources if they do, and I suspect they will. You
- 8 see that reference?
- 9 | A. Yes, I do.
- 10 | Q. Isn't it true that at that time you were aware that if
- 11 | Frontier paid its rent and AMCK did not show up for the next
- 12 | three deliveries, Frontier would likely sue?
- 13 | A. Yes.
- 14 | Q. Now, let me take you to your deposition to close the loop
- 15 | on the question if you in fact notified Mr. Ma that this was
- 16 | their firm position. I'll do it this way if this helps. And,
- 17 | counsel, I'll tell you the page and line I'm on. We've got it
- 18 | up electronically, and I'm turning to page 156.
- 19 Were you asked this question and gave this answer at
- 20 | page 156, line six: I'm going back to the prior exhibit where
- 21 Mr. Ma had asked you to confirm if this was a firm offer from
- 22 | Frontier, and you thought you probably had done so in a phone
- 23 | call.
- 24 Answer yeah.
- Does that give you reference? Yes. Did you give that

- 1 | answer at your deposition?
- 2 A. Yes, I did.
- 3 Q. So you notified Mr. Ma that you believed in answering his
- 4 question in the email chain, you believed this was a firm
- 5 offer?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. And in connection with this phone call, isn't it true that
- 8 Mr. Ma suggested to you that immediate payment eliminating
- 9 outstanding April rent would obligate AMCK Aviation to move
- 10 | ahead with the Framework Agreement?
- 11 A. I can imagine he would have said that. We would have
- 12 discussed that, yes.
- 13 | Q. It's what you testified to, correct?
- 14 A. Yes, correct.
- MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, could I just read into the
- 16 record another portion of Mr. Sheridan's transcript around this
- 17 | time for completeness?
- 18 THE COURT: Very well.
- 19 MR. BUTLER: I'd like to read from page 152, line
- 20 | nine. Question: Did you respond to Gerald Ma's statement,
- 21 | "Can you confirm that this is their firm offer?" Answer: I
- 22 | don't recall it. Maybe I said it in a phone call. I don't
- 23 remember. Thank you, your Honor.
- 24 BY MR. HOSENPUD:

Q. Following your phone call with Mr. Gerald Ma on Frontier

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- Airlines' most recent offer which was to pay April's rent current, May, June, July and beyond on time, you had a text message exchange with him, didn't you?
- A. I believe yes. I don't recall the precise chronology.
- Q. Let's put up Joint Exhibit 42, please. We're going to go to page three. So I'll represent to you that these were produced in this litigation. They are your text to Gerald Ma. We're on the date of April 30, 2200. You see that?
- 9 | A. Yes, I do.
 - Q. In this text you say, For Frontier. I would suggest that we go back to them with, get back current up to July before the delivery, move the deliveries as they have offered, three this year and two in Q1, 2021, have extensions on the 14 delivered and remove the early termination options on the six from the new deal that disappear if the airline has no missed payments between now and May 2021.
 - Did I capture that accurately?
- 18 | A. Yes, you did.
 - Q. And in this text exchange nowhere do you say Frontier is not current in terms of owing rent, do you?
 - A. Well, I think I say it in the next paragraph, but it wouldn't have necessarily been needed to be said in this text exchange.
 - Q. But you don't say it here? You don't say Frontier is now in default because it's past the ten-day grace period, do you?

- 1 A. I don't say it.
- 2 Q. The final paragraph of this email, of this text exchange,
- 3 | Is if they say no tonight, then we have to consider the nuclear
- 4 option. This is to terminate the SLB because of nonpayment of
- 5 | lease rent, correct?
- 6 A. Correct.
- 7 Q. So at this time the notion of the nuclear option was
- 8 | revised again, wasn't it?
- 9 A. Yes, because Frontier was in default on the lease
- 10 | agreements.
- 11 | Q. And you said nothing about that in this communication or in
- 12 | any other communication to Gerald Ma as of April 30, 2020,
- 13 | correct?
- 14 A. Well, I think I say it in this paragraph, terminate the
- 15 | sale and leaseback because of nonpayment of lease rents in
- 16 April.
- 17 | Q. You are saying here though that you're activating the
- 18 potential nuclear option, right?
- 19 A. Well, I think maybe the original terminology used in March
- 20 | was a walkaway. In this case, it's a termination based on
- 21 nonpayment. So it's still a termination of the Framework
- 22 | Agreement, but just for reasons here of nonpayment of lease
- 23 | rent.
- 24 | Q. And these rents are April rents and we're still in April on
- 25 | April 30; is that correct?

- 1 | A. That's correct.
- 2 | Q. And you do not say nonpayment of rents after April 21,
- 3 | 2020, do you?
- 4 A. It's just a text message exchange, no. We were speaking in
- 5 shorthand.
- 6 Q. At no place do you say in any of your communications,
- 7 | either in email or shorthand, that the termination is for
- 8 | nonpayment of rent after April 2021, correct?
- 9 A. I'm not sure I quite understand the question.
- 10 | Q. You don't say it here in this text message. You didn't say
- 11 | it in the prior email that we saw on the same date, did you?
- 12 | A. Well, I'm sorry, I do -- I'm still a little confused
- 13 because I do say it in this text message, but I wouldn't have
- 14 | laid out precise details within text message or an email when
- 15 | we were having ongoing discussions with the shareholders on so
- 16 | many occasions.
- 17 | Q. And ongoing discussions with Frontier?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 | Q. And knowing Frontier was having ongoing discussions with
- 20 | Airbus?
- 21 | A. Yes.
- 22 | Q. Isn't it true, sir, that you received a text message from
- 23 | Francis Lee indicating that Gerald Ma wanted you to arrange a
- 24 | phone call between CK Assets, Mr. Ma, and Indigo Partners, the
- 25 | shareholder of Frontier?

- 1 Α. Yes, I recall it.
- 2 And isn't it also true that Mr. Lee wanted you to do this 0.
- because Mr. Ma had requested so that Mr. Ma could say to 3
- somebody at Indigo Partners, this is an unwanted nuclear 4
- 5 option; is that right?
- I think that was -- if you can show me the exhibit with the 6
- 7 wording.
- 8 Q. Happy to. Let's look at exhibit 46 at page seven. At the
- bottom here it says, Paul, Gerald just added, If Frontier don't 9
- 10 agree anything, please arrange a call between GM and Indigo
- 11 Partners before our IC. GM is Gerald Ma, correct?
- 12 Α. Correct.
- 13 Indigo Partners is one of the shareholders of Frontier,
- 14 correct?
- 15 Α. Correct.
- And IC is your, what, committee? 16
- 17 It would be the investment committee at CK Assets Holdings. Α.
- 18 Mr. Lee goes onto say, We have only one shot. We want them
- 19 to know that this is an unwarranted nuclear path. You see that
- 20 reference?
- 21 Α. I do.
- 22 Did you ever make that arrangement for that call?
- 23 Α. No.
- 24 Isn't it true that you had a conversation with Mr. Dempsey 0.
- 25 on April 30 after he received your proposal in response to the

- 1 one made by Frontier on April 30?
 - A. Yes, correct.
- 3 | Q. And in that proposal you were accepting of the three
- 4 | aircraft in July, prior to that it was two aircraft in July and
- 5 one in June; but now it was three aircraft in July, and two in
- 6 | Q1 of 2021, correct?
- 7 A. Among other conditions, correct.
- 8 | Q. And then you stated that you wanted payment to be done by
- 9 May 15 of the rents that had been deferred, correct?
- 10 A. Could I see the wording precisely so I can answer that.
- 11 Q. Certainly. Exhibit 123, scroll down. This is the preface.
- 12 | I misspoke. This is the preface to your call summary with
- 13 Mr. Dempsey. Let me move on. We have it up now. Thank you.
- 14 This is exhibit for the record 120. All right. So
- 15 | you laid out three conditions, deliveries in July, three
- 16 | aircraft; and February, two aircraft, correct?
- 17 A. Correct.
- 18 | Q. All payments to be current on May 15, 2020, and to remain
- 19 | current, correct?
- 20 A. Correct.
- 21 | Q. You don't say all payments that's are in default to be
- 22 | current on May 15, 2020, do you?
- 23 | A. I don't.
- 24 | Q. And then you have the lease extensions as well?
- 25 A. That's correct.

- Q. You concede that this was a very unusual provision,
- 2 | correct?
- 3 A. That's correct.
- 4 Q. Following this you had a call with Mr. Dempsey to discuss
- 5 | this?
- 6 A. That's correct.
- 7 Q. And in that discussion he made a different proposal which
- 8 was to agree to the schedule for the deliveries, agree to the
- 9 | May 15, 2020, deadline for repayment, and finally to prepay
- 10 | rent on all five of the aircraft by six months. Is that
- 11 | correct?
- 12 A. I think it is. But, again, if you can show me the email
- 13 | that he followed up with on that.
- 14 | Q. Yes. We'll get there. He was calling you -- he was
- 15 | talking to you about what he could advance, and you decided to
- 16 | take that back to the shareholder, correct?
- 17 A. I imagine that is correct, yes.
- 18 Q. And isn't it true that Mr. Dempsey on May 1, texted you and
- 19 | said, Could I get an update for that proposal?
- 20 A. I don't recall that text. Again, if you could show me.
- 21 Q. Let's look at Joint Exhibit 127. And we're going to scroll
- 22 down to a more legible version of that.
- It's dated May 1, 2020, to you, and you recognize that
- 24 | it's being sent by Mr. Dempsey?
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 He states, I had expected a call today. What's the status? 2 And you respond, We're about to get on a call with the
 - And then he indicates, Okay. Airbus gave us an additional 24 hours to get this done, correct?
- Correct. 6 Α.

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- You never called Mr. Dempsey back, did you?
- I don't think so. I don't recall. 8

shareholders. It's at 4:30 our time.

- 9 0. And you never communicated with him in writing, did you?
- 10 I don't think so, no. Α.
- 11 And in this communication you understood that negotiations
- 12 were ongoing with Airbus, correct?
- 13 Α. Correct.
- And further you didn't state anything about getting current 14
- 15 on April rents, did you?
- 16 Α. I did not.
- 17 Let's look at exhibit 42, page 13, please.
- 18 You were asked some questions about this text message 19 exchange with Mr. Ma regarding the termination of the Framework 20 Agreement, correct?
- That's correct.

Α.

- 22 And you stated you just want to get it done before they can
- 23 complicate anything; is that right?
- 24 Α. That's right.
 - And your desire was to make sure that Frontier didn't pay

- 1 | the rent before a termination could happen, correct?
- 2 A. I think like I said yesterday that at that point, we were
- 3 | quite focused on getting the termination done. We especially
- 4 | didn't want to have any complicated factors within the day of
- 5 | the termination that might have made it difficult; for example,
- 6 | the rent payment arriving at the same time as the termination
- 7 notice going out. And so once the decision had been taken, we
- 8 wanted to get it executed quickly.
- 9 Q. But you didn't want Frontier to complicate it by making
- 10 | rent payments; is that correct?
- 11 A. I think that's correct, yes.
- 12 Q. Because if they had made the payment, you would have
- 13 received rents, and you couldn't do the termination, correct?
- 14 A. That's correct.
- 15 Q. Now, Mr. Dempsey sent you another communication on May 8,
- 16 exhibit 142; isn't that right. This is comprised of two
- 17 | emails, one on May 8, at 7:51, and I believe this is in the
- 18 | morning, it's Denver time, wherein Mr. Dempsey says, Been
- 19 | waiting patiently for your response to our call whereby I
- 20 | offered the following solution: The next aircraft delivery to
- 21 be moved to July 2020.
- 22 So that was a change to confirm what Mr. Dempsey
- 23 | thought he could get as of April 30; is that right?
- 24 A. That's right.
- 25 | Q. And a prepayment of rent six months on the near-term

- 1 aircraft deliveries; three aircraft delivering in July, and 2 seeking deferred rent for April and May, and having that being repaid from July through December 2020, correct? 3
- That's what he offered. 4 Α.
- 5 Q. And then he followed up with the fourth concession which is at the top of this chain: Replacing AMCK as a financier on two 6 7 aircraft to deliver in Q4 2020, and moving those deliveries to Q1 021? 8
- A. As well as reiterating his rejection of our previous 9 10 proposal, yes.
- 11 Yes. He told you why it was impractical?
- 12 Α. Yes.

- 13 And he explained that the economic cost to Frontier would 0. 14 be astronomical, didn't he.
- 15 Α. I'm not sure he said astronomical, but he explained that he 16 was rejecting the proposal because of that, yes.
 - You never responded to this email, correct? Q.
- That's correct. 18 Α.
- 19 MR. HOSENPUD: Nothing further.
- 20 REDIRECT EXAMINATION
- 21 BY MR. BUTLER:
- 22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Sheridan. I just have a couple of 23 follow-up questions, and I want to ask you about this document 24 that you were just shown which is an email from Mr. Dempsey.
- 25 It appears to be reiterating a proposal that was made on that

- 1 | April 30th call; is that correct?
- 2 A. Yes, that's correct.
- 3 Q. I want to ask in particular about the third item on this
- 4 proposal. Deferred rent for April and May 2020 is repaid from
- 5 July through December 2020.
- Is that element of this proposal consistent with your
- 7 | request that all deferred rent be repaid before the next
- 8 | aircraft delivery?
- 9 A. It's not consistent.
- 10 Q. Did you view this latest proposal from Mr. Dempsey as a
- 11 step forward or step back in the negotiation?
- 12 A. Probably a step back. It made me realize we were not going
- 13 to reach an agreement.
- 14 Q. We're finish with that document so you can take it down.
- 15 Yesterday Mr. Hosenpud asked you whether you had
- 16 ever -- whether on the April 7th call you told Mr. Dempsey that
- 17 | you needed authority from CK to agree to the month-to-month
- 18 proposal. Do you recall that?
- 19 | A. I do.
- 20 | Q. Whether you said anything to Mr. Dempsey about it or not,
- 21 | did you want approval from CK for that proposal?
- 22 | A. I did.
- 23 | O. Why?
- 24 A. A more significant concession than just the ten-day grace
- 25 period, I thought it's generally my style to be more

- collaborative anyway as well. I would have wanted to have a collective view on what to do next, rather than anything unilateral on my part.
 - Q. Mr. Hosenpud also ask you some questions yesterday about some messages talking about a MAC clause or a material adverse change. And he asked you about whether the shareholder was interested in walking away from financing upcoming deliveries. Do you remember that testimony?
- 9 | A. I do, yes.
 - Q. In early April 2020, did you want to walkaway from the upcoming financing?
 - A. I don't think I did, but it was a very difficult time. I was trying my best to make sure that we could have -- bring the shareholder together with the airline and ourselves to have something that would work for all parties.
 - Q. Mr. Hosenpud also asked you today about some documents that refer to the nuclear option, and at least one of those text was your use of the term.
 - So why did you refer to termination of the Framework Agreement as the nuclear option?
 - A. I guess in short, two reasons. One is the magnitude, and I think the reality of a nuclear option is one that hurts both parties in some way. So, yes, mainly because of the magnitude of what we were contemplating.
 - Q. In your use of the term, is a nuclear option a desirable

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- 1 option or an undesirable option?
- 2 A. I would say undesirable option.
- 3 MR. BUTLER: Thank you, Mr. Sheridan. I have nothing 4 further.
 - MR. HOSENPUD: Your Honor, may I have just a few questions on redirect? Recross, pardon me?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOSENPUD: Thank you.

- RECROSS EXAMINATION
- 10 BY MR. HOSENPUD:
- 11 Q. Mr. Sheridan, at the time of the May 8 set of emails that
- 12 | you received from Mr. Dempsey, isn't it true that Mr. Dempsey
- 13 had not taken payment immediately off the table from his
- 14 communication with you of April 30?
- 15 A. Excuse me. It doesn't look like he wasn't offering to pay
- 16 | the overdue rent immediately at that point.
- Q. He had left that open on April 30, to which there had been
- 18 no response; isn't that correct?
- 19 A. That's correct.
- 20 | Q. He never took it off the table though, did he?
- 21 He knew that that was an option?
- 22 | A. I would say it's always an option to pay overdue rent, yes.
- 23 \ Q. The second term, prepayment for six-months rent for the
- 24 | next three deliveries. That had a value to AMCK of
- 25 | approximately five million per aircraft total?

- A. No, approximately --
- 2 | Q. Five million total?
- 3 A. No. Six months, the request would be \$300,000 per month,
- 4 so six months is somewhere between 1.8 and \$2 million per
- 5 | aircraft.

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- 6 0. Times five aircraft?
- 7 A. Three aircraft in this case.
 - Q. Which would get you over five million, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- 10 MR. HOSENPUD: That's all I have.
- MR. BUTLER: Nothing further, your Honor.
- 12 | THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sheridan. You're excused.
- 13 | THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
- 14 (Witness excused)
- MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, with Mr. Sheridan's
- 16 | testimony, the defense rests.
- THE COURT: That just leaves closing arguments, and when would you prefer to do those?
- MR. HOSENPUD: Your Honor, we have conferred, and it
- 20 | is the preference to start those up after the second session,
- 21 | in the second session today, 2:15.
- 22 | THE COURT: Oh, today?
- MR. HOSENPUD: Yes.
- 24 THE COURT: In other words, this afternoon?
- MR. HOSENPUD: This afternoon.

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Sheridan - Recross

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THE COURT: And we'll take a recess now and resume at 1 2:15. 2 3 MR. HOSENPUD: Thank you, your Honor. We are just keeping the record open just to tidy up some last exhibits to 4 5 put them in the record. 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. HOSENPUD: Thank you. 8 THE COURT: You want to put in scattered things that 9 you didn't have in hand? 10 MR. HOSENPUD: Yes. We'll pick that up right at the 11 beginning. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Can't remain open forever. 13 MR. HOSENPUD: Understood. We'll put it in right at 14 the beginning of the afternoon session. Thank you. 15 (Recess) 16 (Continued on next page) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	AFTERNOON SESSION
2	2:30 p.m.
3	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
4	MR. HOSENPUD: Your Honor, if I could just supplement
5	the record now very briefly with the exhibits we've been
6	speaking of.
7	THE COURT: Sure.
8	MR. HOSENPUD: Yes. Joint Exhibit 27, Joint
9	Exhibit 52, Joint Exhibit 54, Joint Exhibit 135, Joint
10	Exhibit 171, Joint Exhibit 172, Joint Exhibit 173, Joint
11	Exhibit 174, Joint Exhibit 180, and Joint Exhibit 181.
12	
13	MR. BUTLER: No objection, your Honor.
14	THE COURT: Received.
15	(Joint Exhibits 27, 52, 54, 135, 171, 172, 173, 174,
16	180, 181 received in evidence)
17	MR. HOSENPUD: Thank you.
18	THE COURT: Mr. Butler.
19	MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, good afternoon. I'd like to
20	start this afternoon by reviewing some of the facts that are
21	not in dispute.
22	AMCK terminated the Framework Agreement on May 8,
23	2020, by sending a formal notice setting forth the grounds for
24	termination. The grounds were that Frontier failed to pay rent
25	under 14 aircraft leases during the month of April 2020.

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And there is no dispute that Frontier did not make these rent payments in the month of April. That's obvious from the fact that Frontier actually did pay all of that rent in May, after the termination by AMCK.

There is also no dispute that Frontier knew the due date and amount of each rent payment. The monthly rent was agreed at the time that each lease was entered, and we heard from Mr. Sashikumar that Frontier kept careful track of that, and AMCK also sent invoices well before the due date specifying the amounts due.

Now, the non-payment of rent under the 14 leases was a cross default under the lease for the 15th aircraft. the one that delivered in March of 2020, MSN 10038. And a default under the MSN 10038 lease was an event of default under the Framework Agreement, that gave AMCK the right to terminate the Framework Agreement without prior notice to Frontier.

Now, Frontier contends in this case that the termination by AMCK was improper, and therefore, constituted a breach of the Framework Agreement. The claim is that AMCK waived the right to timely payment under the 14 leases through its communications with Frontier.

The parties agree, I believe, that Frontier has the burden of proof on that issue. That's why I'm speaking first on these summations. Frontier must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a waiver occurred and was continuing as of

the termination date, May 8, 2020.

Now, waiver of a contract right depends on intent. It is the voluntary abandonment or relinquishment of a known right. To prove waiver, there must be a clear manifestation of intent to give up a contract right.

Now, under New York contract law, a waiver can be express or implied, meaning it could be established by words or conduct. But here, the 14 lease agreements in question require a waiver to be express. And the Court has already observed that in the summary judgment ruling earlier in this case, but I want to remind everyone of the language involved, so I'd like to put up Joint Trial Exhibit 2, which is a representative sample of the lease agreements, and I am going to go to page 97, section 20.4, the section that deals with waivers.

So if we look at 20.4(a), on the third line in the middle of the page, it says, "The rights of both parties against the other or in relation to the aircraft" then there is a paren "shall not be capable of being waived or varied otherwise by an express waiver or variation in writing."

And then a little further down the page, three lines from the bottom, or sorry, of this section, three lines from the bottom of this section, "And no act or course of conduct or negotiation on the part of such party or on its behalf shall in any way preclude it from exercising any such right or constitute a suspension or any variation of such right."

So that deals with waiver, and there's also some relevant language just below dealing with variations to the agreement. It says — this is in 20.4(b) "The provisions of this agreement shall not be varied otherwise than by an instrument in writing executed by or on behalf of lessor and lessee."

So those contractual provisions restrict the waiver, any waiver that might be possible in this case.

Now, the Court has already ruled that a waiver does not have to be in writing, but it does have to be express. So an implied waiver is not enough. And a waiver in this case, as I just read, cannot be based on any act, course of conduct, or negotiation. That means that conduct alone is not enough for a waiver. And by the same token, silence or inaction does not qualify as a waiver.

And of course, a waiver must always be clear. That's part of the basic legal standard. A waiver requires a clear manifestation of intent. So ambiguous records are not enough, and words susceptible to multiple meanings are not enough for a waiver.

Now the claim of Frontier in this case is that AMCK expressly waived right to payment during a telephone call between James Dempsey and Paul Sheridan on April 7, 2020. But in evaluating whether an express waiver occurred on that call, we believe it is important to look at the events of the

preceding day, April 6, 2020, and the reason for that is that both sides agree that an express waiver occurred on that day.

And it is important to compare what happened on April 6 to what happened on April 7.

So, what happened on April 6? Well, there was a request from Frontier for relief from two rent payments that were due that day. And there then was a telephone call involving Robert Fanning and Paul Sheridan, in which Mr. Sheridan agreed to a forbearance or grace period of 10 business days ending on April 21. And let me just show you, he confirmed that in an e-mail the same day, that's Joint Trial Exhibit 63.

He confirmed all this in writing, setting forth the terms of the waiver very clearly. So you don't get more express than the waiver in this April 6 e-mail.

Now, also, on the AMCK side, Mr. Sheridan reported this 10-day grace period to the shareholder CK in an e-mail to Gerald Ma. That's Exhibit 64.

Here he's catching him up on the discussions with Frontier, and he talks about the grace period of 10 working days, which he talks about in the past tense. He says we extended them a grace period. So he's reporting something that had already been done.

On the Frontier side, information about the 10-day grace period was disseminated within the Frontier organization.

And remember Mr. Sashikumar, the gentleman who's responsible for getting authorizations for rent payments. As Mr. Fanning stated, Mr. Sashikumar needed to be kept in the loop with respect to rent payments. Well, after the April 6 call, Mr. Fanning informed Mr. Sashikumar about the 10-day grace period, both by text and by e-mail. And I'll just remind the Court the text is JTX 67, Mr. Fanning to Mr. Sashikumar. And then the e-mail is Joint Trial Exhibit 60, where the e-mail is forwarded as well to Mr. Sashikumar.

So in these two ways, Mr. Sashikumar was informed on April 6 about this 10-day deferral period.

So, let's get to the April 7 call. This is the key disputed factual issue in this case. But the evidence shows that there were only two people on that call, Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Dempsey. And there are two different accounts of what happened. Mr. Dempsey says Mr. Sheridan agreed to a month-to-month deferral on the call. He says that month-to-month meant deferral until the next delivery from Airbus, which was expected to be in late May, but might be even later. Mr. Sheridan says that a month-to-month deferral was discussed, but not agreed. He says that month-to-month meant deferral on April rent first, with May rent to be considered later if necessary.

Now, the words used during this call are in dispute, but the written communications that took place after the call

speak for themselves. So let's start with the Frontier side.

Communications within Frontier.

The same day as that call, and we'll just put up Joint Trial Exhibit 73, Mr. Dempsey sent a text message to Mr. Fanning about the call. And we've seen this exchange of text messages before. He talks about the month-to-month deferral in the message to Mr. Fanning on the upper-left-hand side. And Mr. Fanning -- he talks about it, but he doesn't explain what it means. Mr. Fanning responds, "Okay, good. Anything mentioned about repayment and are they going to send our revised agreement?" Mr. Dempsey responds, "No, but we should stick to nine months from July 1, let's get a draft to him." Mr. Fanning responds, "They have our draft. I'll follow up with Jane." Referring to Jane O'Callaghan at AMCK. And then Mr. Dempsey mentions that Paul was going to call Jane after we spoke.

Now, as I mentioned, Mr. Dempsey does not explain what month-to-month means on this call. And we've heard from Mr. Fanning that he got a mistaken impression that it was a three-month agreement. In fact, different people on the Frontier side have a different understanding of what month-to-month means. And so it wasn't even clear on the Frontier side what the meaning of that term might be.

It's also clear from this text exchange that no repayment period had been discussed or agreed on the call with

Mr. Sheridan, and we've heard from Mr. Dempsey and other witnesses that the interest rate that would apply to this deferred rent also was not discussed at this call.

We've also seen evidence or heard evidence that both Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Dempsey expected this to be documented in writing, and in fact this text exchange shows that.

Mr. Dempsey says let's get a draft to him, and then Mr. Fanning talks about the draft that had already been delivered to AMCK.

And Mr. Fanning notes that he is going to follow up with Jane O'Callaghan about documenting this month-to-month arrangement.

One other point on the Frontier side. There has been no evidence presented of any text or e-mail to Mr. Sashikumar about this supposed month-to-month deferral. He says he heard about it orally, it's true, but in contrast to the April 6 call, there was no written message delivered to Mr. Sashikumar about this.

Now, on the AMCK side, we have a different set of communications and documents about the month-to-month deferral. And I'll show you Joint Trial Exhibit 76. This is Mr. Sheridan's e-mail to Gerald Ma at the shareholder CK Asset Holdings reporting on the situation with Frontier. And he reports in the second paragraph that "In the meantime, Mr. Dempsey has asked us to do the deferral on a month-to-month basis, conscious that they don't want to be in default." And he goes on to say, "Since the next delivery isn't going to be

in April now that the Mobile plant is shut, I think we can agree to this and give them a bit more time to work with Airbus."

This, your Honor, is the best evidence of what Mr. Sheridan understood month-to-month to mean on that call. What he understood month-to-month, the month-to-month request to mean. It also indicates that there had not yet been an agreement reached. He doesn't report the agreement as something that has already happened. He reports it is something we can agree to. And as Mr. Sheridan has testified, he was sending this e-mail in order to get approval from CK for this additional deferral.

And I think we've also seen evidence and heard from Mr. Sheridan that it was generally important to get CK's approval. They were a very active shareholder, they were very active in AMCK's business, and it is also important that the 14 aircraft for which Frontier was seeking deferral were aircraft that were owned by CK. So it would have been particularly important to get CK's buy in to any rent deferral with respect to those aircraft.

Now, after Mr. Sheridan sent this e-mail, there was an exchange of e-mails within the CK organization, so let's show that. Joint Trial Exhibit 77. And let's see the e-mail from Paul I think is on the second page, if I remember correctly.

And we scooch it over so we can see we see Paul's

e-mail we just looked at, Gerald Ma asks for input from Francis and Lillian and ask if there is going to be 6 percent interest. Then going back to the first page at the bottom. We can see Mr. Ma says, "Personally, I think as long as we don't have to take delivery this month, giving them one-month deferral seems okay."

So this is evidence that, at least on the CK AMCK side, they thought what was being discussed was a one-month rent deferral. Francis Lee chips in to say he thinks it's okay. And the e-mail towards the top of the page, Lillian Kiang also says that she agrees if no delivery in April, we can agree to a one-month deferral.

After this exchange of e-mails with the shareholder at CK, Mr. Sheridan testified that he asked Jane O'Callaghan to put together an agreement. And in fact Jane O'Callaghan did send a draft agreement, Joint Trial Exhibit 79, over to Frontier. And she says in her cover e-mail that this is a draft deferral letter for one of the 14 aircraft, but we are in the process of cloning the letter out for the other 14. Or for the other 13, rather, aircraft.

And let's take a look at the letter itself. The forbearance letter itself. On the first page towards the bottom, you can see that the forbearance here is only for the rent payment due in the month of April. And then if we go to the top of the next page, Rishika, we can see the other terms.

AMCK was proposing an interest rate of 6 percent per annum, and they're proposing a repayment period of three months ending in July of 2020.

Now, I think I said earlier that another document was the best evidence of AMCK's understanding of the month-to-month deferral, but I misspoke. Really, this is the best evidence of it. This is the draft agreement that AMCK put together, and it is perfectly consistent with Mr. Sheridan's understanding of the month-to-month discussion, that it was only going to be for the month of April at first, and that there are other terms that were not discussed, but from AMCK's perspective, they wanted a three-month repayment period, and 6 percent interest.

One other document on the AMCK side is Joint Trial Exhibit 17. That's a series of text messages from Jane O'Callaghan with Robert Fanning. And on page 4 of that exhibit, we can see a text message from April 21, 2020, recall that is the last day of the 10-day grace period offered by AMCK. And Ms. O'Callaghan says to Mr. Fanning, "We haven't had your feedback on draft rent deferral agreement for April. Thank, Jane."

So on the last day of the 10 working day grace period, Ms. O'Callaghan clearly reached out to Mr. Fanning about the rent deferral agreement for April because she hadn't heard anything back from the Frontier side. Once again, even after sending this reminder text, there was no word from the Frontier

side about that draft agreement. Clearly, they never accepted the agreement or entered that one-month deferral with AMCK.

So those are the two versions of that April 7 call, and I've walked through really all of the evidence that is relevant to or almost all of the evidence that is relevant to what happened on that call.

And I want to point out that there are reasons to question Mr. Dempsey's version of events that day. The first thing I would note is in Exhibit 73, and well, why don't you put up Exhibit 73, the first text from Mr. Sheridan. His statement was that there was an agreement on rent deferral on that call. "Agreement" is the term that he used. And that's not credible, your Honor, because the material terms of rent deferral were not discussed on that call. As this exchange with Mr. Fanning makes clear, the repayment terms were not discussed at all. And as I said, we've heard from other witnesses that the interest rate was not discussed either.

Now, and we know that there was no meeting of the minds on one of these material terms, because, as indicated in this text exchange, Mr. Dempsey wanted a nine-month repayment period. And as we know from the draft agreement sent over from AMCK, AMCK wanted only a three-month repayment period.

One other point is that any agreement on rent deferral would have needed to be in writing. And indeed, there is evidence that both Mr. Dempsey and Mr. Fanning expected this

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agreement to be reduced to writing and it never was.

So, whatever happened on that April 7 call, there certainly was no agreement on rent deferral. And that contradicts Mr. Dempsey's testimony and the statement in this text message.

Second reason for doubting Mr. Dempsey's version is that his understanding of what month-to-month means is not plausible. He says month-to-month meant deferral until the next aircraft delivery. But he didn't use those terms at the time. He didn't describe it as a deferral until the next aircraft delivery. He used the term month-to-month. And month-to-month is not shorthand for until the next aircraft delivery. Month-to-month means first one month, and then potentially the next month, and so on.

So his use of the word month-to-month itself is not consistent with his current position that what was discussed was a deferral until the next aircraft delivery.

There is another reason to question his version of events, and that is that he changed his story on the meaning of month-to-month between his deposition and his testimony here in court. So let me show Mr. Dempsey's deposition, I'll start with page 77, line 15. Mr. Dempsey was asked:

- "Q. So was it your understanding that this was an indefinite deferral of rent under your agreements with AMCK?
- "A. No, it was a fluid situation, but clearly, at this point,

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it was for the month of April."

I'll show you page 79, two pages later. Line 10 I asked the question:

"Q. When you use the term month-to-month, does that mean that basically you're agreeing one month at a time? So first, let's agree to the end of April, then later we'll agree to the end of May if it's necessary?

"A. Correct."

Those descriptions of a month-to-month deferral are precisely consistent with Mr. Sheridan's understanding of month-to-month. But, deferral for the month of April would not be enough for Frontier to win this case. The termination took place on May 8th. So any waiver that was limited to the month of April would have expired by that time.

So now we have different testimony from Mr. Dempsey.

He says month-to-month doesn't mean at first to the end of

April. He says until the next delivery and he has another

variation of until all negotiations are complete. Your Honor,

the fact that Mr. Dempsey has changed his story is another

reason to doubt it.

Just another point I'd like to make is Mr. Dempsey's account of the April 7 call is also quite incongruous or inconsistent with what happened the day before, on April 6. So on April 6, Mr. Sheridan agreed to a waiver, and -- well, I'm sorry. He agreed to a waiver or a forbearance that was narrow,

and carefully defined. It's 10 working days, until April 21.

And he documented that forbearance in a written e-mail shortly after the call.

Now, according to Mr. Dempsey, on the very next day, Mr. Sheridan agreed to an open ended deferral with no clear end date. And according to Mr. Dempsey, Mr. Sheridan did not memorialize the agreement in any way. He just agreed to it on a phone call. So to believe Mr. Dempsey, we really would have to conclude that Mr. Sheridan underwent a kind of personality transplant between April 6 and April 7. According to Mr. Dempsey, his behavior on these two days was completely different.

Now, it makes no sense that Mr. Sheridan would have acted so differently on two consecutive days of April 2020. Since it makes no sense, it probably did not happen that way.

One other reason to question Mr. Dempsey's account is that there are no internal communications apart from that one text message that we looked at, confirming the month-to-month arrangement from within the Frontier organization. And remember, Mr. Sashikumar, the gentleman who needed to be kept in the loop, there's no text message or e-mail to him about a deferral past that 10-day deferral to April 21. And there are no other internal memorializations on the Frontier side of the month-to-month agreement, no other documents from the Frontier side that clarify what month-to-month means.

Now, to be sure, Frontier witnesses have all testified that they believed a deferral was in place while negotiations with AMCK are underway, but they all got that information from Mr. Dempsey. Mr. Dempsey was the only one on the April 7 call with Mr. Sheridan. So if Mr. Dempsey's story is not believable, then none of the other Frontier witnesses are credible on this point either.

The last point I'll make, your Honor, the last reason to question Mr. Dempsey's credibility with respect to the April 7 call, is the correspondence that took place immediately after the termination. Mr. Dempsey said he was shocked when he got the termination notice from AMCK, because there was this month-to-month waiver in place. But in the two letters written by Frontier immediately after the termination, there is no mention of the April 7 call, and no mention of a month-to-month agreement. Mr. Dempsey testified that he was involved in the preparation of both these letters. He at least reviewed them before they were sent.

And I want to show you first Joint Trial Exhibit 150. This is a letter from Mr. Ernie Yu of AMCK. This is actually after the first letter. But I just want to emphasize that in AMCK's response, it was emphasized that no waiver took place, and in fact in that third paragraph of this letter, at the bottom, Mr. Yu says, this — he's referring to the April 6 agreement, the 10-day waiver, and he writes "This is the only

commitment made by AMCK with respect to non-payment of rent by Frontier, and that commitment obviously expired after April 21, 2020."

So now let's go to Joint Exhibit 151. This is the response from Frontier, and obviously this letter was sent in order to rebut the contention of AMCK that no waiver had occurred, and that the only waiver was the April 6 agreement.

And in fact, that's what the letter says. And Mr. Diamond, the author of this letter, says in the fourth paragraph, "I would like to remind AMCK of the following facts that support our claim that AMCK both expressly and impliedly deferred Frontier's payment obligation with regard to the leased aircraft." And what follows is a chronology of numbered paragraphs describing the events that support Frontier's claim that a waiver occurred.

And I'll direct the Court's attention to numbered paragraph 3 where the April 6 e-mail is discussed, and the position taken here is that, in the second sentence, it says, "And thus any deferral given should reasonably be interpreted to survive while Frontier and Airbus were finalizing the aircraft delivery deferrals requested by AMCK."

So the position taken here is that the April 6 10-day waiver should be reasonably interpreted to survive. And then the next paragraph goes on to the April 30, 2020, letter from Mr. Sheridan, and then subsequent paragraphs talk about other

events. But, the letter jumps from April 6 to April 30, without any mention of an April 7 telephone call, and without any mention of a month-to-month deferral.

Now, on the other side of the coin, we believe there are a number of reasons to believe Mr. Sheridan's testimony that there was no agreement on April 7, and that month-to-month deferral meant at least in first, at first, deferral for the month of April.

agreements are almost always documented in writing in this industry. And there is evidence that both sides expected any rent deferral between Frontier and AMCK to be documented in writing. There's also evidence that Mr. Sheridan was being particularly cautious around this time about having his words construed as a binding commitment. And you may recall that language that Mr. Sheridan appended to the bottom of some of his proposals to Frontier. He did not want his words to be casually interpreted as binding commitments.

Mr. Sheridan in fact had already resisted any kind of open ended deferral when he constructed the 10-day grace period for April 6. He was very careful to say that it only lasted until April 21. He was very careful to define his terms.

There's also considerable evidence that Mr. Sheridan wanted to run important decisions past the shareholder, CK Asset Holdings. As I said, that was especially true for this

Summation - Mr. Butler

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rent deferral decision, because the rent proposed to be deferred was for aircraft owned by CK. So the financial impact of this rent deferral would affect CK as an individual shareholder.

We've also seen evidence that Mr. Sheridan was under pressure from his shareholder to not give anything away in this negotiation and to extract the best possible deal from Frontier. We've seen some of those e-mails from Gerald Ma. Some of them have exclamation marks and all caps, where Mr. Sheridan was asked to -- was told we only have one shot at this negotiation.

So for that reason, there is reason to think it's unlikely that Mr. Sheridan would have agreed to any open ended deferral on the spot, without checking first with CK Asset Holdings.

I'd also add that Mr. Sheridan's testimony is fully corroborated by the written communications immediately after April 7. He reports it to CK as something that can be agreed to, not something that was agreed to. And the draft agreement prepared by Ms. O'Callaghan is perfectly consistent with Mr. Sheridan's understanding of what month-to-month means. the fact that a draft agreement was sent at all confirms Mr. Sheridan's expectation that whatever was discussed on April 7 would be committed to a written agreement.

I'd just add that Mr. Sheridan's understanding of

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understanding of that term. Month-to-month implies that you start with one month, and then you may or may not agree on the next month, you may or may not agree on the month after that, and so on. That's just the natural meaning of that term, and it's consistent with Mr. Sheridan's version of events.

Finally, Mr. Sheridan has been consistent and has not

month-to-month deferral is also the most natural and plausible

changed his story in any material way between his deposition back in 2022 and his testimony yesterday and today. His story is also perfectly consistent with the correspondence from AMCK immediately after the termination in 2020.

Now, your Honor, the April 7 waiver is Frontier's main argument, and we submit it's really the only factual issue that needs to be determined in this case. But there are some other I'll call them themes explored by Frontier in their questioning of witnesses.

Our position is that these themes are all irrelevant to the issue of waiver, particularly the issue of waiver on April 7, but I want to touch on a few of them.

First, there is a theme in the questioning that

Frontier negotiated with Airbus at AMCK's request. And

Frontier witnesses have testified that Frontier did not want to

do this negotiation with Airbus, and that it was a tough

negotiation to try to move the dates of these aircraft.

There seems to be a suggestion that somehow, that this

somehow binds AMCK to a rent deferral, until the next aircraft delivery. Now as a legal matter, Frontier's conduct vis-a-vis Airbus should not bind AMCK in any way. Frontier's conduct cannot create a waiver by AMCK or a rent deferral agreement.

And I'd also ask the Court to remember that Frontier testified that it started these discussions with Airbus before the April 7 call, so they're not directly related to whatever was discussed on that call.

Another point I'd make is Frontier had its own reasons for negotiating delays from Airbus. We saw evidence that Frontier in the end negotiated dozens of aircraft deferrals, and Mr. Dempsey testified yesterday that Frontier had its own business reasons for some of those aircraft deferrals.

One more thing on this topic. AMCK did suggest pursuing delivery delays from Airbus, but they did so in response to Frontier's request for rent deferral. So Frontier clearly had its own incentive to pursue these talks with Airbus. Frontier wanted the rent deferral from AMCK, and these talks were one way to achieve that goal.

Another theme that has developed in the questioning by the -- on the Frontier side is there may be arguments about AMCK's silence, and the fact that AMCK did not respond to certain requests or queries from the Frontier side.

There are a number of variations on this theme. It's been emphasized that AMCK never asked Frontier to pay the rent

that was due. It's been pointed out that they stopped sending chase e-mails during a period of time. Another variation is that when Frontier offered to get current, AMCK did not say anything. There has also been testimony that Frontier asked AMCK if they would finance deliveries if Frontier got to up to date on its rent payments, and AMCK did not respond. And this morning we heard testimony from Mr. Sheridan and a number of questions from Mr. Hosenbud establishing that AMCK never told Frontier that its rent was overdue, and it certainly never told Frontier in advance that there was going to be a termination of the Framework Agreement.

These arguments about AMCK's non-responses, about AMCK's silence, are red herrings for two reasons. First, the lease agreements require an express waiver as I indicated. An implied waiver is not enough. So AMCK's silence with respect to payment of rent cannot be construed as a waiver of payment of rent.

And second, I'd just add that Frontier knew when all these payments were due. The amount and due dates were established when the lease agreements were entered, and as I pointed out, Mr. Sashikumar maintained a database to tell Frontier when all these payments were due. So Frontier didn't need reminder e-mails or questions from AMCK to know when its lease payments were due. There was just no secret about that.

Another theme that has been advanced through

questioning is that AMCK delivered a consistent message that

Frontier needed to be current by the next delivery date. Now

it's true there is evidence that Mr. Sheridan and

Ms. O'Callaghan delivered that message, and there were

variations on the message, but the gist of it was that Frontier

needed to pay all the past due rent before any further

deliveries from Airbus. Those statements, however, arose in

the context of negotiation over the rent deferral requested by

Frontier. Those statements describe a limit on what AMCK could

agree to in the negotiation, so they were not made in a vacuum.

And Frontier, it appears, wants the Court to read those

statements as standalone concessions that Frontier did not have

to pay the rent. But they should not be read in isolation,

your Honor, and they should not be read out of context of the

ongoing negotiation.

Remember, the agreement says that negotiation cannot constitute a waiver. So statements made plainly in the context of a negotiation cannot just be snatched out of context and made into binding waivers.

The last point I'll discuss, your Honor, has to do with the argument that AMCK never wanted to take delivery or that AMCK always wanted to terminate. We've seen evidence that at least some individuals on the AMCK side, particularly at the shareholder, had some questions about whether delivery was appropriate. There was evidence about Gerald Ma asking about a

MAC clause, clearly exploring the possibility of terminating the Framework Agreement early on.

THE COURT: Mr. Butler, before you develop that point, let me ask you a question about the points you've made so far.

Let's assume that because of the incoherence and internal conflicts about dates and extensions of time, there was never a coherent waiver reached to pay the rent on the 14 planes. And therefore, the right to payment continued unimpaired. Let's assume all of that in your favor. And it may be easy to reach and it may be impossible to reach, but let's assume that.

Would not you still face liability under the law for the failure to give the notice and opportunity to cure?

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, no. Simply because the lease agreement provides no notice — there is no provision of the lease agreements that allows or that requires notice and opportunity to cure when a default occurs. It's the nature of these agreements that they're extremely strict —

MR. BUTLER: I don't believe so, your Honor. I don't believe so. There is an obligation that arises when there has been a waiver, if it is going to be withdrawn, there must be a reasonable opportunity to cure, after the waiver is withdrawn. But that presumes the existence of a waiver in the first place. I thought we had addressed this in our trial brief, but that's

our position certainly, that where there is no waiver at all, unless there is some provision of the agreement that requires prior notice, the party is free to terminate the contract, based on the default.

THE COURT: Of course, the contract says that for non-payment in the manner of stipulated within five business days of written notice must be given.

MR. BUTLER: If you could tell me the provision, I can take a look at the contract.

THE COURT: My larger point is, isn't that simply a statement of the general law?

MR. BUTLER: I don't believe it is, your Honor. I don't believe it is. I think where there is a payment default in particular in these lease agreements, the lease agreements are very strict, and I don't believe there is any common law or contract law general provision that requires, once a default occurs, that requires some kind of notice that you are going to act on the default.

It may seem kind of harsh, but that's the business reality in this industry, that the rent payment provisions are very strict, so there's no requirement -- yeah. Absent something in the agreement, I don't believe there is any requirement under New York law that you provide prior notice of a termination where a default condition exists and is continuing.

THE COURT: I interrupted you. You were on your way to your final point.

MR. BUTLER: Very close to it, your Honor. I was talking about the theme that AMCK never wanted to take delivery of these aircraft. And I want to point out that the record does not indicate that this was some kind of plot on the part of AMCK to terminate from the beginning.

In fact, there's evidence that AMCK viewed termination of the Framework Agreement as a terrible option. They called it a nuclear option, something you don't want to do unless you have to do it.

And in the end, this option was taken only after careful consideration and after a meeting of the AMCK board authorizing the termination. Before that time, there was no official decision on the AMCK part -- on the AMCK side, to terminate the agreement.

And before that decision, the evidence indicates that AMCK was negotiating in good faith to try to avoid this outcome, to try to reach an agreement with Frontier.

So, your Honor, I'll end by just saying, in sum, that the only waiver in this case is the 10 working day forbearance that was agreed on April 6, and that expired on April 21. And because Frontier was in payment default, beginning after April 21, AMCK had every right to terminate when continue did, on May 8th.

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I want to thank you, your Honor, for the time and attention that you've given to this case, and for your careful consideration of our arguments. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Butler.

MR. SCHAER: Just one moment, your Honor, while we get situated here.

MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, while the other side is getting situated, I have an answer to your question now that the provision is in front of me. Your question was about the five business day period in Section 16.1(a) I believe. And -
THE COURT: That's the one in the Framework Agreement,

MR. BUTLER: This one is one in the lease agreements, so the lease agreements that required the rent to be paid. And the five business day period that you referred to, your Honor, towards the end of Section 16.1(a), applies to any other sum due under this agreement, but it does not apply to any basic rent or security.

THE COURT: What's your point?

MR. BUTLER: My point, your Honor, is that the five business days that you asked about, that doesn't apply to basic rent which is a defined term.

THE COURT: I was simply asking if it didn't apply. I wasn't -- I wasn't asking what it said.

MR. BUTLER: Pardon me, your Honor. I misunderstood.

Forgive me.

MR. SCHAER: Good afternoon, your Honor.

Time. This case is about time. The time Frontier wanted for rent deferrals, the time AMCK wanted for delivery deferrals, and the time it would take each of them to reach formal agreements on both of those key items.

So what did the parties do? They gave themselves time. Specifically, AMCK granted Frontier an informal deferral, or a waiver, as us lawyers or the law calls it, to provide the time necessary to first negotiate and reach an agreement with Airbus, delaying deliveries of the remaining five aircraft due under the Framework Agreement, and second, only after reaching that agreement with Airbus, negotiate and finalize an agreement with each other on the terms of a formal written rent deferral.

But while the waiver was ongoing, while negotiations were ongoing, and without ever saying it was withdrawing the waiver or expecting a payment, AMCK terminated the Framework Agreement, abandoning its remaining obligations to pay for, and take delivery of, the five aircraft that we know it didn't want. As a matter of law, it cannot do that. And that is why we are here today.

Now, as the Court astutely observed, this case is facially complicated but the principles are quite simple. Was there a waiver? If so, what is the scope of that waiver? Was

the waiver properly withdrawn and was Frontier provided a reasonable time to repay? And finally, damages.

I want to walk through each of those now, but before I do, I will just ground us in the familiar breach of contract elements. Those four elements, of course, there is a valid contract, a breach of that contract, performance by the party trying to hold the other in breach, and damages.

Now, there is no dispute that there is a valid contract in the case, that is the Framework Agreement, the Court saw that at length and the Court also saw all of the interrelated contemporaneous contracts involving all of the other parties relating to lease agreements.

Nor is there any real dispute, factual dispute on the second element, that AMCK terminated its obligations under the valid Framework Agreement.

So the real dispute in this case is on the third element, whether Frontier performed its contractual duties consistent with the waiver, such that it can hold AMCK in breach for that termination of the valid contract.

Of course, there is a disagreement about the extent of damages, which I will address at the end.

So, what is a waiver? It is a clear manifestation of a party's intent to relinquish a contractual right. That's it. It can occur through express statements, which we have many of in this case. It can also occur through affirmative conduct or

by failure to act so as to evince an intent not to claim a purported advantage.

Even when there is a complete non-waiver clause in a contract, which we do not have in this case, but even where there is a complete non-waiver clause in a contract, New York courts still find that a waiver exists when a party has clearly manifested an intent to provide one, be that through express statements or through conduct.

Now, as discussed previously, waiver is a part of contract law. When there is a dispute as to material terms, which we have here, courts are instructed to look to that extrinsic circumstantial evidence to discover whether the waiver existed, and its scope.

Also like contract law, any alleged subjective, secret, unstated intent by one of the parties is irrelevant to the pertinent question of what did the defendant clearly manifest to the plaintiff.

Now, counsel explained a couple other principles related to waiver. One of them is that silence is not enough. First, the full quote is mere silence is not enough. When there are other things combined with silence, silence is an important factor here. But no one, at least we are not saying that all they provided was silence. There is a lot in the record on top of their repeated silence, in response to our questions about their commitments.

There is also a comment that uncertain terms in a waiver are not enough to create a waiver. No one is saying that. We are just saying when there is some dispute over material terms, which is here, the Court employs the usual contract interpretation principles to discover what those disputed terms meant.

So that bring us to the question, what did AMCK clearly manifest to Frontier? Everything it communicated to Frontier underscored that there was a waiver in place.

Now, what was the scope of that waiver? First it was 10 days, and then it was extended on a month-to-month basis. With the understanding, reinforced many times over, in many mediums, that so long as there was no delivery of an aircraft, the waiver could continue.

Now what was the purpose of the waiver? AMCK has actually put that in writing for us. It was to provide the parties the time to negotiate and reach an agreement with Airbus on delivery deferrals, and second to negotiate and reach an agreement with AMCK on rent deferrals.

Darcy, will you unmute the video for a second.

I just want to show the Court a demonstrative that we looked at earlier in the case to clarify this point. This is the construct. This is the waiver. It was a month-to-month rent deferral, a month-to-month waiver to provide the parties with the time to do the things on the bottom. First it was

Airbus delivery deferrals, and to negotiate the terms of a rent deferral repayment. Later, near the end, AMCK starts asking for additional lease concessions, we saw those, the lease extensions for all 18 aircraft, or for 18 of the aircraft that would have amounted to about \$200 million.

Now, of course, the area in red or to use the nuclear option and terminate the Framework Agreement, that is not something that Frontier knew. But, everything else, this is the construct, we need a waiver to provide us time to do these things on the bottom. So long as there was no delivery, the parties still had the time and the waiver continued.

Now the Court has seen a lot of evidence that corroborates this. We've seen testimony from AMCK's own witnesses that corroborates this, including Ms. O'Callaghan saying the waiver was in place to allow Frontier time to reach agreement with Airbus. We've seen contemporaneous documents from the parties, including the one from Mr. Sheridan on April 6 that establishes the first waiver laying out the understanding and the construct. And I quote his words, "Mindful of the time it might take to you reach agreement with Airbus or to make some other arrangements and therefore of the ability for us to reach a deferral agreement, you have 10 business days. You have until April 21."

We have Mr. Dempsey's testimony about the April 7 call explaining the extension of the waiver to the month-to-month

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understanding, using that same construct reached and expressed on April 6. He also explained why it was extended. Because there was no chance that there was going to have an airplane delivery in the next 10 business days. Airbus was closed until April 29. Nothing was going to happen on April 21. And with the concern being there cannot be a delivery before payment, the parties could push that out.

We've also heard from Mr. Sheridan that he has no memory of what was said on that call, so we have one account.

But we did hear from Mr. Sheridan this morning that he wanted the month-to-month waiver. And we know that he then reached out to his shareholder who then approved that, what he says had him seeking approval. We'll come back to that momentarily.

Now, I want to be clear that none of Mr. Dempsey's deposition testimony is out of step with that understanding. We saw some snippets, we tried to put in the larger portions during the actual testimony, but what is clear is that on April 7, when the parties reached the month-to-month understanding, Frontier had not yet gotten the next airplane out of May. That next plane was delivering into May. So when asked the question to Mr. Dempsey, hey, first you'll agree to the end of April, and then you'll later have to agree to the end of May, and he says that's correct, that's because he didn't have until the end of May. He needed to go back to

Mr. Sheridan and say I have moved the delivery and, therefore, the repayment moves along with it. That is the waiver. So long as there is no delivery, there is no payment. The delivery was still in May when they first agreed, it moved into June, and then later it moved into July. And so, too, with it, the waiver period.

We also have the contemporaneous text message by Mr. Dempsey to his team at Frontier stating unequivocally:

Just spoke to Paul Sheridan, he has agreed to do the deferral on a month-to-month basis.

We have repeated references from AMCK that their consistent concern all the way back on April 1st in a text message between Ms. O'Callaghan and Mr. Fanning is that rent deferrals on the 14 aircraft must be linked to delivery deferrals of the remaining five neos in 2020. That's Joint Exhibit 17.

That was reiterated ad nauseam as the Court saw throughout the parties' conversation. Repayment is linked to deliveries.

You also have Mr. Fanning telling Ms. O'Callaghan on

April 29 that one solution to the parties' negotiations is that

"the current rent deferral would stay in place."

Ms. O'Callaghan says nothing to alter that understanding, that there is still a rent deferral in place on April 29.

We have Mr. Dempsey telling Mr. Sheridan both on

April 27 and April 30 that we, Frontier, understood and were operating under the assumption that you just wanted no outstanding payments at the time of the next delivery. On April 27 and April 30, Mr. Sheridan says nothing to disabuse Frontier of its understanding and assumption of the waiver.

We have Mr. Sheridan's internal communication to his shareholders on April 30, saying in his own words, "Frontier will immediately pay outstanding April rents on which we agreed an informal deferral pending agreement with Airbus on delivery delays." That's the waiver in his own words to his shareholders on April 30.

He testified this morning that when he said April, what he really meant was April 21 and 10 business days. That is not what he wrote to his shareholder on April 30 when he says "on which we agreed an informal deferral pending agreement with Airbus on delivery delays." Says nothing about the waiver being over on the 21st. Says nothing about it expired at that time. He echos exactly what the parties have reached. That as long as there is no delivery, the waiver continues, to allow the parties time to complete negotiations with Airbus, and then each other.

In the record, the only date that AMCK ever gives to Frontier, besides the next delivery, is on May 15, or that date is provided on April 30, and AMCK requests repayment by May 15. The parties never got to May 15.

And we've seen that the negotiations were ongoing between the parties into May. After having an April 30 phone call, Mr. Dempsey is waiting for Mr. Sheridan's response, and he sends him a text message on May 1st saying what's the status, I'm waiting for your response. Does Mr. Sheridan say, the waiver's over? We're now past April 21, we're now past April 30. No, he says I need to talk to my shareholder, I'll get back to you. We saw Mr. Dempsey then had to follow up with him again on May 8 because Mr. Sheridan still did not respond, knowing Mr. Dempsey was looking for a response. Did he respond to that May 8 query? Of course not. The next thing from AMCK is the termination notice.

Now, we also have testimony from all of Frontier's witnesses that corroborate the understanding of the month-to-month deferral. They understood the scope of the waiver. They all said that no one ever told them anything that called into question their understanding, and that they were all incredibly conscious of not going into default with AMCK. Mr. Dempsey said this in the text messages to Mr. Sheridan, or, sorry, the e-mails to Mr. Sheridan on April 6, that's Joint Exhibit 63. Mr. Dempsey reiterates this to Mr. Sheridan on their April 7 phone call where they agreed to the month-to-month deferral. And we know that because Mr. Sheridan communicates that to his shareholders that Frontier is incredibly conscious of going into default with us. That's

Joint Exhibit 77.

And indeed, Frontier paid all of the rent due through the end of March, even after asking for a rent deferral on May 16, it is still paying its rent, because there was no waiver in place yet. But once a waiver was put in place, only then did Frontier stop paying.

Though to be clear, Frontier actually continued to pay rent on MSN 10038. Even while that waiver was in place, that payment coming on April 16, because that was the only aircraft that AMCK clearly manifested that it was excluding from the waiver, and Frontier was conscious to pay that one always on time.

Of course, we have all of those chase alerts, those are at Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 and 8. Reflecting that every time AMCK believed Frontier was behind by even one day, it would send a chase alert, and Frontier would pay immediately. Now, of course, AMCK was not sending those alerts for exactly our waiver period. It sent them right before, it sends them right after, but conspicuously it does not send them while we understand that there is a rent waiver in place.

Finally, I should just say that month-to-month is not a new term. These are sophisticated and smart parties, but they did not invent that idea. Now, counsel says that month-to-month obviously means it ends at the first month and you have to talk about moving it to the next month. New York

case law says otherwise. We put this in our trial briefing,
I'll reiterate it here so the point is clear. New York case
law explains that a month-to-month tenancy has an indefinite
term and continues until terminated by notice. That is the
definition of month-to-month.

Now, there is a reason this well known month-to-month term was used in this case. And than is because, as I alluded to, the parties did not know when the next delivery would occur when they agreed to it, and therefore they didn't have an exact date by which to peg the waiver. They always knew it was after April, but at that point, it was in the back half of May. But if Frontier could move the deliveries out into June, into July, the waiver would go with it. That is why they called it a month-to-month, and not to the end of April, and not a one month. Because it was pegged to a moving target.

Every act in this case manifested to Frontier clearly that there was a month-to-month waiver linked to the next delivery. And so long as there was no delivery, the waiver continued, repayments did not need to be made, and the parties still had what they wanted, which was time to complete their negotiations.

Now, what does AMCK say about this waiver? Two main things and both of which speak for themselves. The first is that the parties only ever agreed to a waiver until April 21. Now, for this to work, Mr. Sheridan needs to have acted

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completely differently on April 6 and April 7. I was surprised that counsel made a similar point in his presentation that our idea is Mr. Sheridan needed to act completely different on those two dates. Seemingly that he sent a follow-up e-mail on April 6, but he doesn't send a follow-up e-mail on April 7, and therefore it is impossible to reconcile these two things. Of course, the explanation being that he didn't have the phone call with Mr. Dempsey on April 6. He wasn't talking to the executive on April 6, so he needed to inform him of what he agreed to. But on April 7, he is talking directly to Mr. Dempsey. This is executive to executive level conversation. There was no need to inform Mr. Dempsey on what was agreed upon, because he agreed to it with Mr. Dempsey.

Now, our understanding, or as they have explained what happens with Mr. Sheridan -- and I'll put up our second demonstrative now -- is that on April 6, Mr. Sheridan -- let me try to make it a little bigger. On April 6, Mr. Sheridan felt that he had the authority, felt he had the ability to get on a phone call with Frontier and reach an agreement. There is no dispute that that happens. And directly after he reaches out to his shareholder and he leads to catch you up, and the key language there being "to give us a bit of time to reach an amicable agreement, we extended them a grace period of 10 working days on non-payment of rents."

So on April 6, Mr. Sheridan testifies he agrees on the

call with Frontier to give them the waiver, and then he follows up with his shareholder only to say, I reached the agreement.

He's not asking for approval on the 6th. He is not asking for permission on the 6th. He is telling the shareholder what he did.

Now, April 7, something seems to have happened to Mr. Sheridan's authority, ability, understanding of his job. He has the phone call with Mr. Dempsey, where Mr. Dempsey remembers they agreed, he provides a month-to-month waiver, but Mr. Sheridan's testimony is that he didn't do that. Well, I don't remember exactly, but I don't think I would have done that. What I did is actually I had to then reach out to my shareholder, and now, one day later, I need approval for these types of things.

Now, it's curious because he uses almost the exact same language that he uses on April 6. A quick update on the situation with Frontier. He's not saying I need your advice, I need your approval. Then again we'll go down here, the key language is highlighted. In the meantime, he, meaning Mr. Dempsey, "asked for us to do the deferral on a month-to-month basis. They are also conscious that they don't want to be in default with us. Since the next delivery isn't going to be in April now that the Mobile plant is shut, I think we can agree to this and give them a bit more time to work with Airbus."

There is no request for approval here. There is no request for permission here. There is no question mark here. It mirrors exactly what Mr. Sheridan does with the shareholder on April 6. Hey, this is what I've agreed to, I am giving you an update on it.

And if there were any doubt as to what Mr. Sheridan's role is, let's go to the next page of the demonstrative. This is the testimony of Gerald Ma, AMCK's shareholder. And the question to him, is "My question to you, sir, it wasn't the idea or wasn't the idea of prepaid rent yours?" And here's his answer: "no, I'm not so sure. I — probably not. I don't get into the details, I don't run the company. It's Paul was the CEO. So how we — how we negotiate, how we discuss with lessees not — not my job." That is from the shareholder.

Now, even countenancing Mr. Sheridan's understanding that he needed to get this permission, it is then curious that he never actually follows up with Frontier. He reaches out to the shareholder on April 8. Each of them in their own way says this is fine. One says one month, one says the month of April. One says month by month. They all tie it to there being no risk of delivery.

But Mr. Sheridan's understanding, their case, his testimony is that after he gets this permission that he was seeking, he then never goes back to Mr. Dempsey and says anything to him ever again about this month-to-month waiver

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Summation - Mr. Schaer

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that they discussed. That's their construct. Instead, instead of Mr. Sheridan going back, their allegation is that the only response they ever had between the phone call only between Mr. Dempsey and Mr. Sheridan, is that Jane O'Callaghan, who is not on that call, and not on this thread with the shareholder, reaches out to Robert Fanning, who was also not on the April 7 call, and sends a draft rent deferral agreement which is completely silent about the Airbus deferrals which was the centerpiece of the phone call on April 7. To them, that is the response to the question for month-to-month waiver tied to deliveries. Again, that speaks for itself.

And I will say that under the law, once there is a waiver, the notice of the withdrawal, which is necessary, that notice must be clear, distinct, and unequivocal. It must fix a reasonable time within which to act, and inform the other party that failure to perform by that date will be considered a That April 9 e-mail between Jane O'Callaghan and Robert Fanning meets none of that criteria.

Now, also to buy this construct that Mr. Sheridan had authority on one day, didn't need permission, but the next day totally different, we have to ignore that throughout the end of April, and into May, they met continuously to say internally that the waiver is still in place. We gave them through April. We have Ms. O'Callaghan's notes on an internal document that they just need get back to Frontier by April 30 on the deferral

request. Not April 21, nor that it is expiring, just we need to get back to them.

We also have to ignore all of the internal documents we saw in Mr. McInerney's a bit arduous deposition video from late March through May 8th, all of which say rent deferral requested under negotiation.

And of course we have to ignore that AMCK never said anything to Frontier on April 21, on April 22, on April 30, on May 1st, or at any other time that called into question that there was a continuing waiver, despite the parties being in near constant communication. Again, the question for waiver is clear manifestation and that is obvious. There was a continuing waiver.

Now, AMCK's other main contention is that there needed to be a written agreement. And that written agreement needed to contain three terms. The length of the rent deferral, the length of the repayment, and the interest due.

No one disputes that there eventually needed to be a written agreement. That was always intended as far back as the March 16 letter that Frontier sent. That is in fact the focus of the parties' communications after April 7 when they reached that month-to-month waiver. But that was also the basis of the waiver. It was to give the parties time to do that negotiation, which could only occur after the Airbus negotiations were done, and only then reach a written

agreement.

And we've seen in the record a lot about Frontier negotiating different terms for what would eventually be that formal written agreement. We see Frontier asking for nine months of a repayment period, first in its March 16 draft, and then in Mr. Dempsey asking or commenting to Mr. Fanning after Mr. Fanning asked about what should we do about the revised agreement. They're clearly discussing the formal written agreement.

Later we see Frontier talking about, hey, maybe we'll just pay you 50 percent, 50 to 75 percent at the first delivery, the remaining 25 percent at the second delivery.

These are just their negotiations on that formal agreement.

And of course we have Frontier at the end saying, forget linking repayments to delivery, we will repay you right now.

We will repay you immediately and we will stay current forever.

Let's bring this negotiation to a close.

That was the negotiating of the eventual written agreement that Frontier was trying to get to.

Now, we also have AMCK negotiating different terms.

Now, they stayed reasonably consistent with their request that we just want you to pay at the next delivery. But then they start adding new terms at the end such as we want significant extensions on all of your aircraft to the tune of a \$200 million commitment. Now, of course the difference between

the parties' negotiations is that while Frontier's continued to get better, or continued to bridge the gap, AMCK's demands continued to get more extreme. Which, as it turns out intentionally, but unknown to Frontier at the time, kept the parties from being able to finalize that written agreement that Frontier was trying to get to.

Now, we heard some talk about the attorney letters that came in after the fact. Your Honor, those are letters that were drafted by counsel. They were drafted by in-house counsel, they were drafted by outside counsel, none of whom were involved in the actual negotiations here. Mr. Dempsey couldn't answer many questions about it due to privilege. But, that is just the fact. They are signed by the in-house counsel, and he did testify that that's who was involved in drafting them, and outside counsel. And they're clearly summarizing the events that had happened over the previous month and a half. And they are two to three page documents that obviously cannot capture the more than 100 exhibits that we have gone over in this case. But nevertheless, they clearly state that Frontier understood that it was still within a waiver period at the time that AMCK terminated on May 8.

These letters in many ways support all of the actual evidence that we've seen in this case between the actual players involved and the testimony that you've heard and you've seen. And they certainly do not supersede any of it.

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Now, how did the parties actually act? Again, we have disputed material terms, so actions matter in understanding those disputed material terms. They acted completely consistent with the understanding that the waiver was to provide time to negotiate with Airbus, and then negotiate with each other. Frontier uses that time that the parties provided with the waiver to immediately and tirelessly start working with Airbus to move out airplane deliveries, even though it was to a significant financial detriment. It was not able to collect its purchase price proceeds which were about 5 million per aircraft. It wasn't able to recollect its PDP refunds which was about 10 million per aircraft. So it's 15 million per aircraft that Frontier is pushing out at a time when it is desperate for liquidity at the beginning of the pandemic that the airlines are on the front lines and nobody knows how long. That's what Frontier is doing.

And of course, it is weathering threats of default from Airbus at the same time, saying if you don't show up, we're going to put you in default. This is the central tenet of Frontier's business. It would have ruined it.

What else is Frontier doing? It is communicating constantly the feedback that it's getting from Airbus to AMCK. It is being as transparent as possible. Hey, they'll only move us to June, will that satisfy you? We'll keep working on that. It is telling AMCK all the time, hey, these are the funds we

have. These are our constraints. This is what the government's going to provide to us. These are when the payments are going to come. It is being as transparent with its business partner as possible, under that idea of the waiver, to provide time to complete negotiations.

Now, when Frontier finally provides the exact deferral months it is able to get out of Airbus, AMCK is actually fine with it. Says great. We'll do three in July, we'll do two in February. There is no issue on that piece. But still, without an actual delivery in place during this time, there were no chase alerts, there were no demands for payments, there were no comments that the waiver was over, there were no comments that negotiations were over. The parties continued to act as if the waiver, the month-to-month waiver, was there.

Now what did AMCK do with its time? Let's look at that and let's look at why. Now, to be clear, this does not affect the central question of what AMCK clearly manifested to Frontier. But it does help explain why they acted the way they did, which is otherwise inexplicable.

Now, we have testimony, a lot of which from Gerald Ma, that AMCK and its shareholder were upset with Frontier due to the timing of the rent deferral request coming on the same day that the first aircraft delivered. Now, of course, Frontier has no control over that aircraft delivery date, which is largely governed by Airbus, and was also being influenced by a

tariff regime that was being put in place at the same time, and of course Frontier has no control over the pandemic, and the timing of that, let alone the emergency orders that were going in place just at this time.

But AMCK is upset about this timing, and even more so its shareholder is upset about this timing.

We know that AMCK didn't like the terms of the Framework Agreement. It says "ouch" when it sees the terms of the first aircraft are going to be about 269,000, compared to the 340,000 for pretty much all of the other aircraft that were within its portfolio. We know they wanted out as early as March 23 and March 24, already mentioning the nuclear option and the MAC clause to try to not take deliveries.

And just a comment on the nuclear option. We've heard that what the nuclear option means is that this is the last option, this is not what we want to do, this is AMCK's understanding, we want to do everything but avoid the nuclear option.

Your Honor, they could have asked for payment. That was an option. They could have said the waiver is over. That was an option. The nuclear option that they chose was not the last option, it was their preferred option to get them what they wanted.

We also know their internal financing was drying up. That the bank loan discussions for the aircraft had all been

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put on hold. That the terms were getting worse and worse, and that shareholder funding was likely the way that they would have to move forward.

We know they thought, well, maybe if we can get some really significant QPQs. In their terms, it cannot be normal. And maybe if we can mark the Framework Agreement to the market now, instead of what we actually agreed to, we won't stay in the Framework Agreement. And from that comes the \$200 million ask at the end.

We know they believed that terminating the agreement with Frontier actually gave them the best chance of getting the terms they wanted, that they couldn't achieve in straightforward negotiations, using the crisis of their termination as leverage in following negotiations. And we know that they followed through on that plan to a T. That is exactly what they did.

We also know from Mr. Sheridan's testimony and AMCK's internal documents that the one thing that could ruin that plan was if Frontier paid the waived rent.

Now, their story is built around how badly they wanted to be paid, but again, they never asked to be paid. They never accepted Frontier's repeated offers to pay. We will pay you right now. We will pay you immediately. Because they didn't want to be paid. Because they needed to not be paid. Because that eventually became the pretext for their plan. And that's

why they acted the way they did and intentionally never clarified or followed up on the waived rent.

Now thankfully for the law, and for equity, and for common sense, that doesn't matter for the question of whether or not there is a waiver. Again, subjective, withheld, secret beliefs are irrelevant to what AMCK clearly manifested, which was that there was a month-to-month waiver linked to deliveries to give the parties time to negotiate with Airbus and each other.

So, we have a waiver. Now, how do you actually withdraw it? It depends on the type of waiver. There is one type of waiver that is supported by consideration and justified or justified reliance. Or there is a waiver that's not supported by consideration or justified reliance. And the way to withdraw is different depending on what you have.

Our waiver here is supported by consideration and justified reliance. The consideration of course is the Airbus piece. We are holding off on collecting \$15 million per aircraft at a time when we need cash, and we are weathering these threats of default from our most important partner. We also have the justified reliance, of course, which is Frontier thinks that it doesn't have to make these payments while being incredibly conscious not to go into default with AMCK.

Now, it's black-letter law that of course -- this is a quote -- a waiver supported by consideration or a substitute

such as reasonable and justified reliance may not be retracted without mutual consent.

That is the law. Such a waiver, it basically forms a new contract, and it cannot be withdrawn by unilateral action. AMCK obviously did not have Frontier's assent, and it acted unilaterally, so any withdrawal or retraction was ineffective as a matter of law. Even if AMCK could withdraw it though, they still needed to provide Frontier a reasonable time to cure, which they did not do.

And that bring us to the second category of waiver, the one that are not supported by consideration or justified reliance. Now, if it's one of those types of waivers, a party can unilaterally relinquish it or withdraw it, but to do so they have to provide notice of the withdrawal, and a reasonable time to pay.

Now, our trial brief contains scores of cases and the UCC, and the New York UCC, and Williston on Contracts that reinforces this basic, basic principle. Again, the withdrawal must be clear, distinct and unequivocal, fix a reasonable time within which to act, and inform the other party that failure to perform by that date will be considered a default. There is no notice like that in this case, your Honor. In fact, we know that AMCK contemplated giving us that type of notice, but specifically didn't because they knew we would pay. They discussed this at their board meeting in April, saying we know

Summation - Mr. Schaer

they'll cure if we ask them to pay.

Mr. Sheridan says it to Mr. Ma on May 8 before actually sending the termination notice. Hey, I just want to get this done before Frontier can complicate anything. Before they can pay.

Now, at best, in the light most favorable, that May 8 termination letter should be construed as a notice to Frontier of a withdrawal of the waiver period. But then we paid within a reasonable time. We paid within three business days, which is the grace period provided for in these contracts. And now in these types of circumstances, courts are allowed to impose what they believe are a reasonable time, and we suggest to the Court that the three business day period provided already in the contracts is such a reasonable time.

A quick note about the termination letter that they sent. It only cites outstanding April rents. At that point on May 8, no May rents were past the grace period. They weren't the basis of their letter in any event.

Now, Mr. Sheridan testified that there was a rent that would have been due on May 3, because there was actually one that was due on April 3. That is wrong. The Court should look at Joint Exhibit 192, which clearly specifies the dates, the due dates for all of the payments. There was one due on April 3, but that's because of the weekend and holiday provision where payment is due on the prior business day. So

the first one in May was due on May 5 with a grace period extending to May 8. So it was not past due when they sent their termination notice. But in any event, that is irrelevant because their termination notice solely is based on the April rents.

So in sum, your Honor, there was a waiver, it was on a month-to-month basis, linked to deliveries, and so long as there was no delivery, the waiver continued to give the parties time to first negotiate with Airbus, and then negotiate with each other.

This waiver was supported by Frontier's consideration and justified reliance. It did not expire on May 8. AMCK did not have Frontier's mutual assent to withdraw it, nor did they even try to give Frontier notice to withdraw it in any of the many ways they could have. The opposite in fact is true. And yet we still paid within a reasonable time.

So that bring us to damages. We heard from the experts in this case, Dr. Neels and Mr. de Jounge, and they came to vastly different amounts. Dr. Neels calculated damages at 48,660,000 as of April 8. And Mr. de Jounge calculated damages at about half of that, 24,950,000 as of September 21, 2023.

Now, there are three real disputes between them that give rise to this significant discrepancy. The first is how to even calculate the monthly rent for the replacement leases.

Now, they agree on how you calculate the CDB replacement leases, the three that delivered in July.

The large variance however is on the two Jackson Square aviation leases, the JSA ones, leading to Mr. de Jounge calculating these at about a combined 72,000 less per month over 144 months for two separate aircraft than the figure reached by Dr. Neels, as well as Frontier and JSA themselves.

Now, how did he do that? Well, he says we need to ignore the following items. We need to ignore Frontier's understanding of how its swap rates in its contracts work. We need to ignore JSA's understanding of how the swap rates in its contracts work. We need to ignore how these swap rates are used in these contracts. We need to ignore that swap rates have historically been in the low single digits, never more than 18 percent at the absolute height of inflation in the 1970s. And of course we need to ignore the amount that Frontier has actually been paying to JSA under these leases.

Instead he says we need to believe that Frontier and JSA intended to include assumed swap rates of 59.6 percent and 80 percent into their monthly rent adjustment calculation. Now, this just so happens to depress the rent by 72,000 per month.

Now what did Frontier's expert do? He doesn't ignore any of that. He runs the common sense calculation with a realistic swap rate based how these contracts always work, and

voila, he just so happens to reach the exact same amount that Frontier and JSA reached when they did their own independent calculation.

Now, second, the disagreement is whether to use a discount rate that is debt based or WACC based. A weighted average cost of capital. Mr. de Jounge says it must be the WACC. Now a WACC is put in place to consider and to account for the significant and ever-changing risks that are in the marketplace. Stocks going up, stocks going down, interest rates moving all over the place. But Mr. de Jounge admits that these leases have nothing to do with that, that they are inherently debt-like instruments. They are not subject to any market fluctuations. The market goes up, it goes down, the lease rates stay the same. Interest rates move around, the lease rates stay the same. These are debt instruments. But he says let's still use the WACC.

What does our expert say? This is a debt instrument. It is a mortgage. It is a car lease. The payment is always the same until it's done. Treat it exactly like it is. So use the debt based rate.

Now, third, the third disagreement between them. What is the actual discount rate to use? Mr. de Jounge says, well, listen, although we ignored Frontier completely in calculating their lease rates and understanding swap rates, we must only listen to Frontier for their internal discount rate. And

that's 10 percent which we know really reflects an internal what's called a hurdle rate or a rate at which Frontier will or won't make an investment. So not what we're doing here. But Mr. de Jounge says, let's actually just add 2 percent to that. Because interest rates at the time I am doing my calculation are higher than when I looked at this document that Frontier included 10 percent.

Now, of course, Frontier was still using that

10 percent internal hurdle rate at the time Mr. de Jounge says

I should be using a 12 percent rate. So, once again, we have

Mr. de Jounge saying, well, sometimes we should completely

ignore Frontier, sometimes we should only listen to Frontier,

and coincidentally, in my selections, the damages only go down

significantly.

Now what did we do? What did our expert do? He looked at a neutral third party, Bloomberg, which is the same authority cited in the parties' lease agreements for swap rates. And he said okay, what is Frontier's discount rate? Well, its debt based rent is 1.0445 percent, and its WACC rate is 1.8405 percent. That's at the time of the damages in this case.

Now, to be sure, this is lower than Frontier's usual discount rate as calculated by Bloomberg, caused in part by the unique circumstances of COVID. Though, I also want to be clear that the debt based rate, if you look at what's in evidence, it

stays nearly constant, it is almost always right around that

1 percent figure. And the WACC rate never has exceeded

7 percent in what we have in front of us, even in the years of the highest inflation.

But importantly, it was also AMCK's decision to injure Frontier at this specific time, in large part because of the circumstances caused by this specific time. And to use the crisis of this specific time as leverage to gain an advantage that it is now answering for.

And calculating damages at the time of injury, which is the accepted method, results in the rates I just discussed.

Now, a quick note about taxes. I promise it will be quick, but I know there was a lot of testimony about it. There really isn't a disagreement between the experts here. Both agree that if you use the same tax rate on the front end as you do the back end, you will reach the same amount in the end.

And that's what Dr. Neels did. Now, the reason he did this is because the neutral discount rates provided by Bloomberg are after tax discount rates. So to do the calculations properly, you must compare apples to apples. You must apply the after tax discount rate to an after tax sum of money. If you don't do that, it would have actually inflated our damages. And that is not something that Dr. Neels was interested in doing.

Accuracy was what was important. So there is no real dispute on this piece of the taxes.

to make a claimant whole."

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Now, you need to also, and finally, I should say you need to also consider the taxes that Frontier will pay on a damage award in order to make that whole. Now that is New York law. And you can look at the Gulino case out of the Southern District of New York, and I quote, "A tax gross-up is necessary

Now, Dr. Neels provided us the helpful analogy of the contractor who gets stiffed on a contract for \$100,000, who would have actually only ever had \$80,000 after taxes, but then if you just paid him 80,000, well, he is going to pay tax on that, so he'd only end up with 64,000. So therefore we need to consider the taxes, and we need to pay him the 100,000 to make him whole.

Now, our expert used 22.8 percent as the rate which reflects the incremental tax effect of the next dollar that Frontier receives. This matches the federal constant rate of 21 percent, and the state rates that are around 1 to 2 percent. Now this 22.8 percent impact is the case, even if Frontier shows a tax benefit in a given year, because that benefit will be reduced by 22.8 percent for every next dollar. AMCK showed that the effective rates have been fluctuating recently, which we know is due in large part to COVID, and the financing anomalies and laws that have passed with it. That has resulted in some years of tax benefits for Frontier.

That said, the most recent year Frontier has an

effective tax rate for is 2023, and that is at 134.4 percent.

Of course we are not advocating that the Court should apply a

134.4 percent tax rate to the damages in this case. We are not
saying the Court needs to more than double the actual damages.

That would be absurd. What we are saying is to use the real
world, common sense, actual rate that Frontier will pay on the
damages award, which would be 22.8 percent.

So, in the end, then, when you use the appropriate lease rates, the appropriate discount rates, and the appropriate tax rates, it results in an award of \$48.66 million.

Your Honor, this case, as I stated at first, is about time. The parties entered a waiver because they wanted time before deliveries, time before paying rent, and time to negotiate both of those deals. So, they provided a waiver on a month-to-month basis linked to the next delivery to accomplish those tasks. With its time Frontier did exactly what it said it would, at a significant cost to its business.

And in turn with its time, AMCK and its shareholder began to scheme ways to get out of the Framework Agreement that it was already looking to terminate. Calling the nuclear option, using the MAC, way back in March while there is no dispute that Frontier was fully paid.

Now, after a waiver was created, AMCK intentionally never said anything that would call it into question, because

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if it did, and Frontier paid, like AMCK knew it would if it was ever asked, AMCK's plan would be ruined.

As a matter of fact, and as a matter of law, that is wrong. The Court should therefore return a decision of 48.66 million in Frontier's favor.

Now, before I sit down, I want to mention the time theme one last time. We want to thank the Court for its time and its patience while we've presented the robust factual record in what, as your Honor noted, is really a straightforward case.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Schaer. I have one question for you. The 22.8 percent, if Frontier was making that on its business in normal course, at the end of the day, it would be taxed and nobody would reimburse it for that tax.

MR. SCHAER: That's correct, your Honor. That's as I understand it, though.

THE COURT: Therefore, why now that it gets the money, why should it be reimbursed for the tax? Why shouldn't it simply get the amount of money as though it had earned it under more peaceful circumstances?

MR. SCHAER: You know, I don't know if I fully understood the question, though I do think how the calculation is done, is that if Frontier had a certain amount of money at a given point, that money had already been taxed. And now it

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doesn't have that, and so to then compensate it for that, well, that compensation is going to be taxed again. And so we would actually bring it lower than what Frontier actually had in the -- I think it is the but-for world as Dr. Neels said. So to get us to that but-for world, where Frontier actually ends with the same amount of money that it would have had, we need to consider the taxes it's going to pay on the compensation award.

Again it goes back to that double tax theory I believe that Dr. Neels explained with the contractor, where he has a contract for 100,000, but he would have paid 20 percent taxes on it. So, the contractor only would have 80,000. Now, if the defendant in that case says I should only be liable for 80,000, and the contractor gets paid 80,000, well, then the contractor is going to have to pay taxes on that 80,000, so he is going to be left with 64,000. So that's why when you say all right, contractor, I know you only would have ended with 80,000, but we need to consider the taxes that you would pay in order to get you down to 80,000. So, consider your taxes, in that case it was 20 percent, the damage award is 100,000, which the contractor pays 20 percent on, and then he or she would then be left only with 80,000, the same position he or she should have been in, and that's what would make the contractor whole. Ι hope that makes sense.

THE COURT: I think simply that I should not be

allowed to discuss taxes. But I don't understand where the concept of double taxation comes in. It seems to me it would have paid one tax under normal conditions.

MR. SCHAER: That's right.

THE COURT: But it didn't get that money, therefore it was not taxed on that money. And now it does get that money, and therefore, it pays a tax on it. And it seems to me that they're two single processes.

MR. SCHAER: You know, I absolutely understand the Court's concern. I echo the Court's caution that I should not be talking about tax much more than I do know. If your Honor would like some supplemental briefing to further explain this issue, we are happy to provide it.

I believe that Dr. Neels also attempted to really clarify this in his declaration, but we're happy to give -- I understand the Court's question, and to give it a targeted accurate response, we're happy to provide that.

THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate your addressing that point. And do it with the thought that it must be explained in terms that you would use if you were explaining it to a rather slow child.

MR. SCHAER: It will be --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHAER: -- absorbed that way as well, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you all.

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1	Do you want to file briefs or do you regard that as
2	having been covered?
3	MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, I don't believe we intended
4	to submit post-trial briefs, especially with the summations
5	that we've done. If the Court would find post-trial briefing
6	valuable, of course we would be happy to do it.
7	THE COURT: I have asked the questions that gave me
8	pause as I read your submissions. And if you could address
9	those two questions, I would appreciate it.
10	MR. BUTLER: Certainly.
11	THE COURT: Beyond that, I don't think we have any
12	need for a general discussion of the case.
13	MR. BUTLER: Your Honor, can
14	THE COURT: We have it pretty well in mind.
15	MR. BUTLER: Can we confer and propose a briefing
16	schedule for that, those submissions?
17	THE COURT: Sure.
18	MR. BUTLER: Thank you, your Honor.
19	THE COURT: Sure.
20	MR. SCHAER: Thank you, your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Don't overdo it. Short, brief,
22	comprehensible answers on those points, I think we would
23	appreciate. But we're not trying to conduct a legal seminar on
24	either of them. Okay.

MR. BUTLER: Thank you, your Honor.

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MR. HOSENPUD: Thank you, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Thanks a lot.
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                (Adjourned)
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